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The deference that courts grant agency statutory interpretation has long been a 
source of tension between the three branches of government.  Within that tension lies 
vital issues concerning political accountability, technical expertise, and the methods 
courts use to deal with a massive modern administrative state that was unimaginable 
at the time that the Constitution was drafted.  When it was decided in 1984, Chevron 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council1 sought to alleviate that tension, 
leaving broad interpretative authority to executive agencies, so long as their 
interpretations did not conflict with congressional intent and were reasonable.2 
Just over three decades later, there are signs that Chevron is buckling.  In 
Michigan v. EPA,3 decided in the summer of 2015, the Supreme Court struck down 
a major regulation that set standards for emissions of mercury and other pollutants 
from power plants, on the grounds that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
had unreasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act).4  This holding 
represents a significant departure from the traditional application of Chevron, and a 
sign that the Court may be moving away from a deferential standard of review of 
agency statutory interpretation. 
This note analyzes Michigan and where it fits within the ever-evolving 
framework of the Court’s application of Chevron, and how the case could contribute 
to a continuing decline in the doctrine’s importance and applicability.  Part II 
provides background information on the Chevron doctrine, and how the Court has 
historically deferred to agency statutory interpretation.  Part III examines the facts of 
Michigan and the approaches that the Justices took on their reasoning, and Part IV 
analyzes these approaches and explains how Michigan fits into an ongoing trend 
away from Chevron’s highly deferential standard.  Finally, Part V explores the 
possible implications of the holding in Michigan, and how this decision could affect 
the regulatory process—and challenges to it—in years to come.  
II. BACKGROUND: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 
Chevron is a cornerstone in administrative jurisprudence.5  It is the most cited 
                                                                                                      
 *  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Maine School of Law. The Author would like to thank 
Professor Jeffrey Thaler for his insight into the world of administrative law, and for his invaluable 
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 1.  467 U.S. 837 (1984) [hereinafter Chevron]. 
 2.  Id. at 842-43. 
 3.  135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).  
 4.  Id. at 2707. 
 5.  Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward: 
Foreword, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014). 
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administrative law case (and the third most cited case overall) in American legal 
history.6  While the rules and application of a Chevron analysis may appear 
somewhat convoluted, the issue of deference to agency statutory interpretation 
strikes directly at critical separation of powers issues.  A Chevron case necessarily 
asks: how must the executive branch, through its administrative agencies, interpret 
unclear congressional directives?  How much leeway does the legislative branch 
intend to delegate to the executive branch—and how much can it?  And when can 
the judicial branch step in and offer its own interpretation to overrule what the 
executive branch has done?  
Chevron sought to answer these questions by giving broad deference to the 
executive branch.  The case concerned the EPA’s interpretation of a provision of the 
CAA7 requiring states that fail to meet certain emissions standards to establish a 
permitting program for “new or modified stationary sources” of air pollution.8  The 
EPA adopted a rule permitting states to treat entire industrial plants as a “stationary 
source,” rather than treating each pollution-emitting device within a plant as its own 
“stationary source”: an approach that it called the “single bubble” concept.9  
Environmental groups challenged the EPA rule, claiming that while the CAA left the 
definition of a “stationary source” ambiguous, the definition adopted by the EPA was 
inappropriate given the CAA’s obvious intent to improve air quality.10 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It held that the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA 
was permissible because it was a reasonable resolution of ambiguous statutory 
language.11  The Court deferred to the EPA, which it saw as better equipped than the 
judiciary to deal with the complexities of environmental policy, to determine how 
best to interpret the statute, noting that “the regulatory scheme is technical and 
complex,”12 and that the EPA’s “interpretation represents a reasonable 
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled deference.”13  The 
Court held that when agencies go through the proper notice and comment process 
outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act, they are entitled to deference so long 
as their interpretations are “permissible constructions of the statute.”14 
Central to Chevron’s holding is the idea that agencies have greater technical 
expertise than the courts to interpret statutory language concerning their particular 
fields, and that when it comes to important policy questions, agencies, which are 
politically accountable, should be given deference: 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than 
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge 
must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty 
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for 
                                                                                                      
 6.  Id. 
 7.  42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1977).   
 8.  Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).  
 9.  Id.; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 50766 (1981). 
 10.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841.  
 11.  Id. at 865. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. at 843. 
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assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between 
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution vests 
such responsibilities in the political branches.’15 
This holding has had major repercussions throughout administrative law, giving a 
broad grant of interpretive power to executive agencies, often at the expense of the 
judiciary’s power to “say what the law is”16 through the process of judicial review.  
According to one prominent administrative law scholar, “Chevron might well be seen 
not only as a kind of counter-Marbury, but even more fundamentally as the 
administrative state’s very own McCulloch v. Maryland, permitting agencies to do 
as they wish so long as there is a reasonable connection between their choices and 
congressional instructions.”17  The case’s central holding has also been seen as a 
powerful counterweight against judicial overreach into the realm of policy making, 
by requiring judges to refrain from interfering with validly promulgated 
regulations.18 
In order to put Chevron into effect, the Court has developed a two-step process.  
At Step One, courts must ask whether or not the statute is ambiguous on the matter.19  
If so, the court moves on to Step Two, and determines whether or not the agency’s 
interpretation is a reasonable one.20  This is where the deferential nature of the 
Chevron standard kicks in—a court will only invalidate an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute if that interpretation runs manifestly contrary to the statute’s goals.21  This 
is a high bar for plaintiffs challenging an agency to clear, and one that they rarely 
do.22 
There is another “step” to Chevron: the so-called Chevron Step Zero. This step 
is “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework even applies.”23  Because 
of the deferential nature of Chevron, this question can be a critical one.  A 2008 study 
found that at the Supreme Court, actions granted Chevron deference were upheld 
76.2% of the time, compared with 66% of the time when reviewed de novo.24  For 
these reasons, a court’s decision to accept or not to accept the argument that a given 
                                                                                                      
 15.  Id. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).  
 16.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 17.  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV 187, 190 (2006). 
 18.  Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 
2063 (“Once Chevron is understood as a constitutional responsibility of the judiciary to avoid 
policymaking power, it makes little sense to limit deference only to those interpretations issued with the 
force of law. The judiciary is exercising policy power whenever it supplants an administrative 
interpretation, regardless of the formality of that interpretation or its supposed ‘force.’”).  
 19.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 22.  Dan Farber, Justice Scalia and Environmental Law, LEGAL PLANET, http://legal-
planet.org/2016/02/15/justice-scalia-and-environmental-law/ (noting that there have only been three 
occasions—Michigan being one of them—upon which the Court has determined that an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute was unreasonable).  
 23.  Sunstein, supra note 17, at 191. 
 24.  William Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 187. 1083, 1100. It should be noted that 
these numbers do not differentiate between cases in which the Court decided the question at step or step 
two, but includes all cases in which the Court applied the Chevron framework.  
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action is entitled to Chevron deference could be dispositive in its determination of 
whether or not that action is legal.25 
Michigan, however, is the rare example of a court invalidating a government 
agency’s statutory interpretation at Chevron Step Two, or effectively deciding that 
though the statutory language in question was indeed ambiguous, the agency’s 
interpretation of that language was so manifestly contrary to congressional intent that 
it was not a “permissible construction of the statute.”26  In arriving at this conclusion, 
the court erred.  It did not give the agency the high level of deference required by 
Chevron.  This case, and others which have limited the applicability and importance 
of Chevron deference, are part of an ongoing trend away from judicial deference for 
agency interpretation of statutory ambiguity, which could have serious consequences 
in agency actions.  
III. THE CASE: MICHIGAN V. EPA 
A. The EPA’s Regulation 
The process that culminated in the Michigan holding began in the 1990’s, when 
the EPA became concerned that the regulatory framework it had used to limit 
hazardous emissions from stationary coal-fired power plants had failed.27  Under the 
CAA, these power plants are treated differently, for regulatory purposes, from other 
polluters, and are subject to looser restrictions on emissions.28  When Congress 
amended the CAA in 1990, it included section 7412, which permitted the EPA to 
bring these plants within the fold of other emitters, if, after conducting a study of the 
power plants’ effect on public health, it “finds such new regulation is appropriate and 
necessary.”29 
The EPA undertook that study, and released its findings in 2000.30  It determined 
that the new regulations were “appropriate” because power plant emissions posed a 
serious threat to human health and the environment, and “necessary” because neither 
existing regulations, nor other provisions of the Act, eliminated that threat.31  Key, 
for the purposes of this case, was the EPA’s treatment of costs to be borne by private 
industry as a result of the new regulations.32  The agency decided that “costs should 
not be considered” at the outset when deciding whether or not it was appropriate and 
necessary to include power plants in its more rigorous regulatory framework under 
the CAA.33  
                                                                                                      
 25.   See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 191.  Recent cases have raised the bar that Step Zero presents in 
a Chevron analysis.  See infra Part V. 
 26. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  
 27.  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015).  
 28.  42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (Supp. II 1990). 
 29.  Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1990). 
 30.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct at 2705.  
 31.  65 Fed. Reg. 79825, 79826 (2000). 
 32.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706. 
 33.  77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9326 (2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).  See also 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 9327 (2012) (reiterating the EPA position that costs do not have to be read into the definition of the 
word “appropriate”); 76 Fed. Reg. 24976, 24981 (2011). 
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In compliance with an Executive Order,34 the EPA conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis of the new regulations and determined that the regulations would impose a 
cost of about $9.6 billion a year on power plant operators, with direct tangible 
benefits of $4 to $6 million a year.35  The agency also estimated that ancillary effects 
of the regulation would yield annual benefits of between $37 billion and $90 billion, 
as fewer people became sick from pollutants and spent more time at work and less 
time at hospitals.36  It also found that the new regulation would annually prevent 
about 11,000 premature deaths, 130,000 cases of asthma, and 540,000 days of lost 
work.37  After an extensive period of notice and comment, during which the EPA 
reviewed over 900,000 public comments,38 the agency issued a new regulation, 
known as Mercury and Air Toxic Standards (“MATS”), which took effect in 2011.39  
MATS established federal standards to limit emissions from coal and oil-fired 
power plants with a capacity of twenty-five megawatts or greater, which were 
originally excluded from the CAA, to meet certain floor standards within four 
years.40  Designed to drive cleaner technology, MATS set market-based standards, 
which would be established by averaging the emissions standards of the top twelve 
percent of the plants that had reduced emissions the most.41    
B. The Arguments and the Court’s Decision 
Twenty-three states, including Michigan, challenged these new rules in court, 
arguing that the EPA unreasonably interpreted the Act when it created these new 
regulations.42  They claimed that in deciding not to consider cost, the EPA violated 
section 7412 when it failed to take into account what would be “appropriate and 
necessary.”43  These cases were consolidated and heard in Michigan.44 
At trial, the EPA argued that since section 7412 was silent on the matter of costs, 
while other provisions of the Act mention it, Congress could not have meant that the 
agency would be required to consider costs in its decision to regulate.45  The EPA 
claimed that agencies were actually prohibited from considering costs when not 
explicitly instructed to.46 The EPA also argued that even if it were required to 
                                                                                                      
 34.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993), requiring all regulations with an 
annual economic effect of at least $100 million to undergo a cost-benefit analysis. 
 35.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-06.  
 36. Id.; see EPA Fact Sheet: Mercury and Air Toxic Standards for Power Plants, (Dec. 16, 2011) 
http://www3.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111221MATSsummaryfs.pdf.  
 37.  77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9428-29 (2012).  The EPA also estimated that by 2016, the standards would 
have prevented 2,800 cases of chronic bronchitis, 4,700 heart attacks, 5,700 hospital and emergency room 
visits, 6,300 cases of acute bronchitis, 140,000 cases of respiratory symptoms, and 3.2 million days when 
people must restrict their activities.  See EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
 38.   EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 36. 
 39.  76 Fed. Reg. 80727 (2011). 
 40.  EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 36.  
 41.  65 Fed. Reg. 79825, 79830 (2000).  The Supreme Court approved of a similar EPA scheme 
designed to stimulate technological advancement in the term before Michigan was decided.  See Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).   
 42.  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015). 
 43.  Id. at 2706-07. 
 44.  See id. at 2706 
 45.  Id. at 2709. 
 46.  Id.  
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consider costs, it did so in the manner in which it conducted its regulatory process, 
and at all points after the initial decision to regulate, when, before conducting further 
research, it would have no way of knowing what the cost of regulation would be.47   
The Court, by a vote of five to four, did not accept this argument.48  After 
conducting a Chevron analysis, it held that the EPA acted unreasonably by failing to 
consider cost when it found new regulation appropriate and necessary.49  While the 
Court found that the statutory language of section 7412 was indeed ambiguous,50 it 
held that the EPA “strayed far beyond [the] bounds” of reasonability when it read the 
statute to mean that “it could ignore cost when deciding whether to regulate power 
plants.”51 
The key question that the Court wrestled with is one of timing.  The majority 
and dissent agreed that had the EPA completely disregarded the cost of regulation, 
this would have been unreasonable, and would have therefore failed to survive a 
Chevron analysis.52  Where the majority and the dissent’s analyses diverge is in their 
understandings of when in the regulatory process that consideration of cost must 
occur.  
1. The Majority: The Term “Appropriate” Requires a Consideration of Cost 
in the Decision to Regulate  
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia53 argued that, given the statute’s language, 
“the phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ requires some consideration of costs.”54  
When the agency decided to initiate a regulatory process without considering costs, 
it ran afoul of congressional intent.55  For him, the plain meaning of “appropriate,” 
set against standard administrative operating procedure, must include costs, because 
“[o]ne would not say that it is rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions 
of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental 
benefits.”56  He also cited section 7412’s requirement that the EPA take costs into 
account at other points in the regulatory process as evidence that the agency must be 
required to do the same in the initial decision to regulate.57  
That the EPA did consider those costs down the line is not enough in Scalia’s 
reading.  He rejected the argument that the EPA’s consideration of costs at other 
                                                                                                      
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 2707.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 2706-07. 
 51.  Id. at 2707 
 52.  Id. at 2714.  
 53.  There is some degree of irony in Justice Scalia’s role in the continuing erosion of Chevron, as he 
has long been an advocate of its broad application.  In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 408 U.S. 421, 453 (1987), 
he wrote a concurrence, in which he criticized the court’s opinion—written by Justice Stevens, the author 
of Chevron—for limiting the doctrine’s scope.  See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 
(2001) (applying Chevron deference to a broader range of agency actions); Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE. L. J. 511 (1989) (defending the 
constitutionality and policy merits of Chevron.)  
 54.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.  
 55.  Id. at 2708. 
 56.  Id. at 2707.  
 57.  Id. at 2708.  
388 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:2 
points during the regulatory process was enough to be “appropriate,” citing SEC v. 
Chenery Corp.,58 which held that “a court may uphold agency action only on the 
grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.”59  Since the EPA explicitly 
acknowledged that it did not consider costs in its decision to regulate, that decision 
cannot be considered “appropriate.”  Whether or not the EPA considered cost at other 
stages of the regulatory process is irrelevant, if it fails to embark on the process 
properly.  “What it said is that cost is irrelevant to the decision to regulate,” Scalia 
wrote, “That is enough to decide these cases.”60 
2. The Dissent: Cost Considerations Throughout the Regulatory Process 
Meet the “Appropriate” Requirement in the CAA 
Justice Kagan found this approach far too narrow and unrealistic.  While she 
agreed with the court that, had the EPA completely ignored costs in its regulatory 
decision, that would have been unreasonable,61 she found that the agency’s overall 
consideration of costs was enough to satisfy the standard set by Chevron.62  Kagan 
argued that the majority looked far too fixedly at the determination made at the outset 
of the regulatory process, calling it “a peculiarly blinkered way for a court to assess 
the lawfulness of an agency’s rulemaking.”63  She instead focused on the regulatory 
framework in its entirety, and found that the EPA did indeed consider costs at all 
relevant times.64  She concluded that the EPA did not analyze cost at the outset 
because such an exercise would have been impossible.65  Without having conducted 
the study required of it by the CAA, the EPA would have no way of knowing what 
the cost would be.66  Rather, the EPA did consider cost at all relevant phases of the 
regulatory process, testing what benchmark emission targets for power plants would 
be realistically achievable and what floor standards would be acceptable “with cost 
considerations baked right in.”67  The EPA bore out these considerations in its cost 
benefit analysis, which found that the benefits of regulation would dramatically 
exceed the costs.68  This, for Kagan, was more than enough for the EPA to survive a 
Chevron analysis: 
The Agency acted well within its authority in declining to consider costs at the 
opening bell of the regulatory process given that it would do so in every round 
thereafter . . . [the] EPA reasonably found that it was “appropriate” to decline to 
analyze costs at a single stage of a regulatory proceeding otherwise imbued with 
                                                                                                      
 58.  318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 59.  Michigan, 132 S. Ct. at 2708 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)). 
 60.  Id. at 2710.  
 61.  Id. at 2714. 
 62.  See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 478 (2011).  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Kagan 
argued that “[c]ost is an important factor for agencies to consider in many contexts. But cheapness alone 
cannot save an arbitrary agency policy,” in a decision invalidating agency action.  Id.   
 63.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2714. 
 64.  Id. at 2718. 
 65.  Id. at 2715. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 2719.  
 68.  Id. at 2721.  
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cost concerns.69 
Kagan also rejected Scalia’s reliance on Chenery.70  She argued that while the agency 
did indeed acknowledge that it did not consider costs in its determination that 
regulation would be needed, the regulation it promulgated explicitly stated that costs 
would be examined as a part of developing a final regulation, and that the EPA would 
find the least costly solution available to set its new standards.71  For Kagan, it was 
comfortably within Chevron’s boundaries of reasonability for the EPA to “[consider] 
costs all over the regulatory process, except in its threshold finding—when it could 
not have measured them accurately anyway.”72  
The difference between the two justices’ approaches can be encapsulated in a 
colorful metaphor that they both employed.  Scalia likened the EPA’s failure to 
consider costs at the outset, and then considering costs later, to someone who 
“[decides] it is ‘appropriate’ to buy a Ferrari without thinking about cost, because he 
plans to think about cost later when deciding whether to upgrade the sound 
system.”73  Kagan instead compared the EPA to a driver who finds it  “appropriate 
and necessary,” before looking at prices, to buy new brake pads, and then undertakes 
investigations to determine exactly what brake-pads will best serve her purposes and 
fit within her budget.74  This core disagreement over the agency’s authority to decide 
when and how to consider costs is the key difference between the majority and the 
dissent in Michigan.  
3. Thomas’s Concurrence: Chevron Deference May be Unconstitutional.  
In a concurrence, Justice Thomas issued a broadside attack against the very idea 
of Chevron deference, and claimed that such deference “raises serious separation-of-
powers issues.”75  For Thomas, when agencies are given broad authority to interpret 
broad statutes, they are effectively legislating, in violation of Article I of the 
Constitution, which vests “[all] legislative Powers” in Congress.76  Thomas also sees 
deference to agency action as a violation of Article III, and the power of the judiciary 
to “say what the law is,”77 writing that “Chevron deference . . . [forces judges] to 
abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous statute’ in favor of 
an agency’s construction.”78  He derided the willingness with which courts seem to 
abdicate this authority to the executive branch, and wrote that “we seem to be 
straying further and further from the Constitution without so much as pausing to ask 
why.  We should stop to consider that document before blithely giving the force of 
law to any other agency ‘interpretations’ of federal statutes.”79 
                                                                                                      
 69.  Id. at 2715. 
 70.  Id. at 2726. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 2709. 
 74.  Id. at 2725. 
 75.  Id. at 2712. 
 76.  Id. at 2713 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I., §1). 
 77.  Id. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
 78.  Id. at 2713 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand C Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1983 (2005)).  
 79. Id. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The majority’s reasoning in Michigan suffered from a number of defects, which 
led it to a holding incompatible with settled administrative law.  Specifically, the 
majority misread a consideration of cost into the word “appropriate,” ignored case 
law giving agencies wide latitude in their determination of when and how to use costs 
in their regulations, and disregarded the EPA’s valid evidence that the agency did 
consider cost at all relevant stages.  For these reasons, the Court did not apply 
traditional Chevron deference, indicating a possible move away from that standard 
in future cases.  
A. The Court was Wrong to Read a Consideration of Cost into the Word 
“Appropriate” in the CAA 
The Court’s reading of “cost” into the word “appropriate” here is forced.  The 
plain language meaning of the adjective “appropriate,” according to Merriam-
Webster’s, is “right or suited for some purpose or situation.”80  Applied to facts of 
Michigan, on its own, this understanding of the word “appropriate” would not seem 
to demand a consideration of cost in the decision to regulate.  The EPA could 
conceivably determine that a regulation is “right or suited for some purpose or 
situation”—and consider the effects of that regulation, in terms of cost, after finding 
it to be appropriate.  
Scalia acknowledged that “[t]here are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase 
‘appropriate and necessary’ does not encompass cost,”81 but argued that in an 
administrative context, where cost is central to reasonable regulation, costs must be 
read into the phrase in the CAA.82  He also pointed to the statutory context of the 
CAA, which requires the EPA to undertake several studies, one of which, taken after 
the decision to regulate is made, would determine “the health and environmental 
effects of such emissions, . . . and the costs of such technologies.”83  Since this study 
requires a consideration of costs, Scalia reasoned, cost must be read into the original 
inquiry as well.  “This directive to [the] EPA to study cost,” he wrote, “is a further 
indication of the relevance of cost to the decision to regulate.”84 
What Scalia failed to recognize in his discussion of the emissions study required 
by section 7412, is that such studies must necessarily be undertaken only after the 
decision to regulate has been made—that is, according to the majority’s reasoning, 
after the critical moment of cost consideration has already passed.85  His reading of 
cost into the phrase “appropriate and necessary” presents the EPA with a catch-22.  
On the one hand, it must consider costs in its determination that regulation is 
appropriate.  On the other hand, it has no idea what the costs of a particular regulation 
will be until conducting its study.  It seems highly unlikely that in drafting section 
7412, Congress intended to put the EPA in such a bind.  It seems more unlikely still 
                                                                                                      
 80.  Appropriate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/appropriate (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).  
 81.  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.  
 82.  Id. at 2707-08.  
 83.  Id. at 2708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1990)). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
2016] MICHIGAN V. EPA 391 
that an interpretation that avoids this bind should be found to be “unreasonable” 
under a Chevron analysis.  
It is also worth noting that the statutory language of the CAA could be 
interpreted in another way that avoids this problem.  Since the second study that the 
statute called for (to monitor the effect of emissions) does specifically mention a 
consideration of costs, while the original inquiry only requires that the EPA find 
regulation “appropriate and necessary,” this would seem to suggest that Congress 
was well aware of its authority to require the EPA to consider costs at certain points 
in the regulatory process, and specifically declined to do so at the outset.86  Scalia 
rejected this argument, and claimed that “[i]t is unreasonable to infer that, by 
expressly making cost relevant to other decisions, the [CAA] implicitly makes cost 
irrelevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants.”87  However, read in this 
context, where one potentially permissible reading of a statute creates serious 
practical problems that seem to run contrary to congressional intent, and another 
construction avoids those problems, the latter would certainly seem to be a 
“permissible construction of the statute” as Chevron requires.88  
Reading costs into the word “appropriate” here is also inconsistent with 
established administrative procedure.  Under a scheme established by Executive 
Order, agencies are required to conduct cost-benefit analyses for regulations that will 
have an annual effect of $100 million or more, and explain why the planned 
regulation is better than any identified alternatives.89  This means that the EPA was 
always going to be required to consider costs, and to justify its regulation.90  Given 
this fact, it was incorrect for the Court to determine that the EPA acted unreasonably 
when it determined that it was not required to consider costs at the outset of its 
decision to regulate.  The EPA reasonably determined that, because it would have to 
consider costs throughout the process, and justify its costs through a cost-benefit 
analysis, it would be redundant and wasteful to consider costs in that threshold 
decision.  For these reasons, the Court was wrong to read a consideration of cost into 
the phrase “appropriate and necessary” in section 7412 when conducting its Chevron 
analysis in Michigan.91 
B. The Court’s Reading of Cost into the Term “Appropriate” is Not 
Supported by Case Law 
As Scalia and Kagan acknowledged, cost is an integral part of the regulatory 
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process, and an issue that administrative agencies frequently grapple with.92  In 
Michigan, the court misapplied the standard of deference that agencies traditionally 
enjoy when determining how to read “costs” into their regulations, as the following 
cases demonstrate.  
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,93 the Court reviewed the EPA’s decision 
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when it regulated thermal emissions from large 
power plants.94  There, the EPA was directed by the Clean Water Act to base its 
regulation on the “best technology available” in order to “minimiz[e] adverse 
environmental impact.”95  The holding in Entergy suggests that when agency action 
is reviewed under Chevron, agencies have some discretion in resolving ambiguity 
concerning costs.96  
The Court also permitted the EPA to exercise discretion in its determination of 
how to deal with costs in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.97  In that case, 
the EPA established an emission budget standard, which was designed to protect 
states downwind from major polluters from bearing the full burden of emissions, and 
to require some degree of accountability on the part of the states where the polluters 
were located.98  To encourage such accountability, the EPA established a cost-sharing 
plan, which prohibited states from exceeding a certain “emission ‘budget,’” and 
imposing a federally established implementation plan if they did so.99  The EPA 
implemented this rule based on the so-called “Good Neighbor Provision” of the 
CAA, which requires states to prohibit local pollution sources from “emitting any air 
pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly” to other states’ inability 
to meet EPA air quality standards.100  Though that provision is silent on the question 
of costs, the Court, after conducting a Chevron analysis, upheld the EPA’s use of 
imposed costs as a tool to ensure compliance.101  The Court held that the ”EPA’s cost-
effective allocation of emission reductions among upwind States . . . is a permissible, 
workable, and equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision.”102  
In Michigan, the Court ignored the holdings in Entergy and Homer City.  In 
those cases, the Court gave the EPA considerable latitude in determining how and 
when costs should considered, and considerable deference in its interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute.  In Michigan, on the other hand, the Court did not grant the EPA 
such deference, and instead held the EPA to a novel standard not consistent with 
established Chevron analysis.  
One case in which the EPA was not given latitude to deal with costs (and one 
which was a source of argument between the justices in Michigan) is Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’n.103  In that case, which also dealt with the EPA’s 
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construction of language in the CAA, the Court held that the agency could not read 
cost into its directive to set air quality standards at “levels requisite to protect the 
public health.”104 
  Scalia distinguished the statutory language in the two cases, pointing out that 
“‘[a]ppropriate and necessary’ is a far more comprehensive criterion than ‘requisite 
to protect public health.’”105  Present in Michigan and absent in American Trucking, 
for Scalia, is a consideration of cost in the natural reading of the statutory language 
in question—American Trucking was therefore not controlling: 
American Trucking . . . stands for the modest principle that where the [CAA] 
expressly directs [the EPA] to regulate on the basis of a factor that on its face does 
not include cost, the Act normally should not be read as implicitly allowing the 
Agency to consider cost anyway.  That principle has no application here.106 
But these directives are not as distinguishable as Scalia suggests.  Both are set against 
the same “backdrop of administrative practice” that Scalia claims forces cost 
considerations into the word “appropriate” in section 7412.107  Scalia does not 
explain why the fact that “[a]gencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant 
factor when deciding whether to regulate”108 makes it unreasonable to ignore cost 
considerations in Michigan, but did not prevent a holding in American Trucking 
which forbids the EPA from considering costs when not explicitly instructed to do  
The Court was wrong to set aside American Trucking’s holding prohibiting a 
consideration of costs, while also ignoring Entergy and Homer City’s rulings that 
agencies had broad discretion on when and how to consider costs in the regulatory 
process.   
C. The EPA did Consider Costs in its Decision to Regulate 
Even if one reads cost consideration into the word “appropriate,” the Court was 
wrong to find that the EPA “ignored” costs in its finding that “regulation [was] 
appropriate and necessary”109—the grounds on which the Court claims the EPA fails 
Chevron.  
The EPA claimed at trial that even though it determined that “costs should not 
be considered”110 in deciding whether or not power plants should be brought under 
MATS regulation, the actions that it took in its initial regulation demonstrate that it 
did not “ignore” costs in its decision to regulate, and therefore did not unreasonably 
interpret the CAA.  The majority rejected this argument, noting that the Court will 
not uphold agency action on grounds different from those the agency presented.111  
But, as Kagan pointed out in her dissent, “equally, a court may not strike down 
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agency action without considering the reasons the agency gave.”112  The record is 
filled with evidence of the EPA considering cost in its decision to regulate, and in 
what form its regulation would take.113  While the agency did conclude that “costs 
should not be considered” in its decision to bring power plants under MATS 
regulation, it acknowledged, at that early stage, that it would consider costs at all 
relevant points.114  From the outset, the EPA stated that “the effectiveness and costs 
of controls will be examined along with the level(s) of control that may be technically 
feasible.”115  It also announced that it would commit itself to finding “lower cost 
solutions.”116  In its final rules, the EPA showed the steps it had undertaken, from the 
decision to regulate onward, and concluded that it has made its standards “cost-
efficient.”117  This persistent and rigorous attention to cost in the EPA’s regulatory 
process, including the actions it took when determining that regulation was 
“appropriate and necessary,” show that the agency did not ignore the impact its rules 
would have on power plant operators, but rather considered them whenever it could. 
Therefore, even if the Court correctly read cost into the word “appropriate” in section 
7412, the EPA showed that it did indeed consider costs in its decision to regulate, 
and therefore should not have seen its regulation overturned.  
V. MICHIGAN’S MILIEU: OTHER EROSIONS OF CHEVRON  
Michigan is not an isolated incident.  Rather, it is a part of a trend towards rolling 
back Chevron deference which is evident in numerous recent decisions in which the 
Court has decided not to apply Chevron at all—in effect widening the gap of Chevron 
Step Zero.  
Four days before deciding Michigan, the Court issued its opinion in another 
administrative case with a much higher profile.  In King v. Burwell,118 plaintiffs 
challenged the manner in which the IRS interpreted the Affordable Care Act’s 
creation of government-run healthcare exchanges.119  Many assumed that the 
decision would turn on a Chevron analysis, as this was a case concerning a 
government agency’s interpretation of a statute.120 
 To the surprise of many, the Court held that Chevron was inapplicable, and 
decided the case based on the plain language of the statute.121 It did so on two 
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separate grounds. First, the Court claimed that the question at bar fell into an 
exception to Chevron created by FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,122 in 
which the Court held that in extraordinary circumstances of deep “economic and 
political significance,” in which Congress is unlikely to have made an implicit 
delegation of power, Chevron would not apply.123  Second, the Court determined that 
even if Congress had delegated this important task to an agency, it is highly unlikely 
that it would have done so to the IRS, “which has no expertise in crafting health 
insurance policy of this sort.”124 
Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion in King, has advocated 
for a narrower application of judicial deference than the broad standard granted in 
Chevron.  In a dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC,125 Roberts called for limiting 
Chevron deference to those cases in which it appears clear that Congress had 
intended to delegate the authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity to an 
agency.  “[B]efore a court may grant such deference,” he wrote, “it must decide on 
its own whether Congress—the branch vested with lawmaking authority under the 
Constitution—has delegated to the agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity at 
issue.”126  In King, Roberts appears to have injected this threshold step into the 
Chevron analysis, holding that the doctrine would not apply when it seemed as 
though Congress had not intended to grant the IRS authority to resolve ambiguities 
in healthcare policy.  Legal analysts have seen this decision not to apply Chevron as 
a “striking and significant departure from the normal rule of statutory 
interpretation,”127 and “[offering] opponents of agency action a new arrow for their 
legal quivers.”128  
Gonzales v. Oregon129 shows another exception that has recently been carved 
out of Chevron.  In that case, the Attorney General’s office challenged an Oregon 
statute allowing for physician assisted suicide by claiming that the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 prohibited the distribution of the drugs used in the process.130  
Specifically, the Attorney General claimed that the statutory requirement that the 
drugs be used for a “legitimate medical practice” precluded their use for suicide.131  
Despite the fact that the case turned on an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous 
statutory language, the Court refused to apply Chevron, stating that “Chevron . . . is 
warranted only ‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
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generally to make rules carrying the force of law.’”132 It instead applied a standard 
known as Skidmore deference which directs a court to “follow an agency’s rule only 
to the extent that it is persuasive,”133 a much lower standard than Chevron’s level of 
deference.   
These cases point to a dramatic widening of Step Zero, with the potential to 
swallow the Chevron doctrine entirely.  “The Court [has] limited Chevron’s 
application by restricting the types of agency interpretations entitled to deference and 
by narrowing the implied-delegation rationale,” one scholar has noted.  “Indeed, the 
debate about Chevron today is whether to apply it at all, rather than how to apply 
it.”134 
While Michigan is not a Chevron Step Zero case, the way that the Court applied 
Chevron indicates increasing skepticism with the Chevron doctrine itself.  In effect, 
the Michigan Court acknowledged ambiguity in the CAA and then proceeded as 
though there was none.135  The Court applied a strict textual analysis, focusing 
narrowly on the application of the single word “appropriate” in the CAA, to arrive 
at a conclusion that invalidated an agency action which, under established Chevron 
jurisprudence, ought to have survived.  This lack of deference represents a deviation 
from settled administrative law, and is part of a growing trend towards limiting the 
applicability and effect of Chevron, with potentially serious consequences for 
administrative agency action.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Michigan will make it much more difficult for agencies to defend their statutory 
interpretations, or to know what sort of statutory interpretations will be accepted by 
the court.  After this holding, the EPA, and other regulatory agencies, will be forced 
to meet a much higher standard in order to survive judicial scrutiny.  One commenter 
has noted that “[r]egulatory actors should find Michigan discomfiting; the decision 
suggests that agencies’ freedom to interpret congressional statutes is more 
constrained than they might previously have thought—at least when it comes to 
considerations of cost.”136  After Michigan, Bob Sussman, a former EPA official, 
noted that the significance of the case “lies not in the precise statutory provision 
addressed by the Court, but in the unusually aggressive approach of the majority in 
scrutinizing and then rejecting EPA’s legal and policy choices under a complex 
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regulatory scheme.”137 
This assessment appears to be playing out.  The EPA recently issued regulations 
under its new Clean Power Plan (CPP), which is designed to limit carbon emissions 
and combat climate change.138  These regulations rely on statutory interpretations of 
the Clean Air Act and were developed with the understanding that agency 
interpretations would be afforded a high level of deference.139  Several states have 
already begun the process of challenging these regulations in court.140  On February 
9, 2016, the Court took an uncommon step when it granted a stay in the 
implementation of the CPP pending the legal challenge brought by these states.141  
The states seeking the stay argued that “Michigan v. EPA starkly illustrates the need 
for a stay in this case,” to avoid another scenario in which industry is forced to 
comply with a rule that is eventually struck down.142  In an interview with the New 
York Times, Jody Freeman, a Harvard law professor and former environmental 
counsel to the Obama administration, described this order as “a stunning 
development,” and one that “certainly indicates a high degree of initial judicial 
skepticism from five justices on the court.”143  The EPA has described the order as 
“extraordinary and unprecedented.”144  The Court’s decision to stay the 
implementation of the CPP before a legal challenge can be brought indicates that it 
is continuing to move away from judicial deference to agency actions in the post-
Michigan landscape. After Michigan, the extent to which courts will be expected to 
defer to agency statutory interpretations is not clear. 
Whether this trend will continue, or just how far it will go, will depend on the 
composition of a changing court.  The vacancy on the Court created by the death of 
Justice Scalia on February 13, 2016, makes the murky and difficult subject of 
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predicting where the Court is moving ever murkier and more difficult.145  Without 
Scalia, the Court is, broadly speaking, effectively split on whether or not Chevron 
ought to be applied broadly.  The next Supreme Court justice could be a swing vote 
on whether the doctrine remains intact or not.  It is true that, despite challenges over 
the last thirty years, Chevron has proved durable.  Today, the highly charged tensions 
the Court sought to resolve are flaring up with greater intensity, with the potential to 
overwhelm Chevron.  Admittedly, it is very difficult to predict the direction the court 
is heading, especially in the thorny, complicated, and politically volatile world of 
administrative law.  However, Michigan and cases like it strongly suggest that the 
Court is scaling back Chevron, and moving away from a deferential standard of 
review for agency statutory interpretation. 
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